Different number of bidders in sequential auctions
A talk by Dr. Hikmet Gunay (PhD), University of Manitoba
Date: Wednesday, Sept. 28
Time: 4 pm
Location: Arts Building Room 807, 9 Campus Dr., Saskatoon
Free and open to the public
About this event
A talk by Dr. Hikmet Gunay (PhD), University of Manitoba
We analyze the correct selling order in a second-price sequential auction for two heterogeneous synergistic goods with local and global bidders. We prove that as the number of local bidders in the second auction approaches infinity, the outcome is always efficient. However, as the number of local bidders in the first auction approaches infinity, the outcome is inefficient with a positive probability. By using simulations, we show that selling the good with more finite bidders in the second auction results in a more efficient outcome. If the selling order is incorrect, the probability of an inefficient outcome is around 19%.
Info: economics.dept@usask.ca
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