Different number of bidders in sequential auctions
A talk by Dr. Hikmet Gunay (PhD), University of Manitoba
Date: Wednesday, Sept. 28
Time: 4 pm
Location: Arts Building Room 807, 9 Campus Dr., Saskatoon
Free and open to the public
About this event
A talk by Dr. Hikmet Gunay (PhD), University of Manitoba
We analyze the correct selling order in a second-price sequential auction for two heterogeneous synergistic goods with local and global bidders. We prove that as the number of local bidders in the second auction approaches infinity, the outcome is always efficient. However, as the number of local bidders in the first auction approaches infinity, the outcome is inefficient with a positive probability. By using simulations, we show that selling the good with more finite bidders in the second auction results in a more efficient outcome. If the selling order is incorrect, the probability of an inefficient outcome is around 19%.
Info: economics.dept@usask.ca
Upcoming Events
Greystone Theatre: Women of the Fur Trade
Nov 21-24, 2024
A lively historical satire of survival and cultural inheritance
(CANCELLED) We Have Had Music
Nov 24, 2024
A concert by the USask Greystone Singers and University Chorus
Yann Martel on Writing and Making Sense of it All
Nov 27, 2024
Acclaimed author explores what writing can be and shares insights on his upcoming books