Creating the Non-Existent
It is commonplace to suppose that fictional characters are authorial creations: Sherlock Holmes, for example, was created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.
Time: 3:30- 5:00 pm
Location: ESB 103
Abstract:
It is commonplace to suppose that fictional characters are authorial creations: Sherlock Holmes, for example, was created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. And it is also commonplace to suppose that fictional characters do not exist: there is not nor ever was any such person as Sherlock Holmes. But insofar as creating something consists of bringing it into existence, these two suppositions are incompatible. In this paper, I develop and defend a solution to what might be termed the “puzzle of fictional creation.” The solution involves combining a neo-Waltonian account of engagement with fiction – according to which participants in games of make-believe perform genuine assertions rather than merely pretending to do so – with Cameron’s meta-ontology – according to which the truth-makers for certain existential claims need not incorporate the entities claimed to exist. This yields a view according which Conan Doyle caused it to be true to say “Sherlock Holmes exists” but the truth-maker for this statement does not incorporate Holmes.