

An Introduction to the Theory of Sociocultural Models

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Abstract

This article introduces the theory of sociocultural models (TSCM) along with its propositions, historical and conceptual foundations, ontology, and the methodology for its applications in sociocultural research. Sociocultural models (SCMs) are a structured set of prescriptions for people to interpret the world, communities, other people, and themselves; they are a set of scripts for acting in accord with these interpretations. These models are developed by people's cultural communities and they are learned and internalized by their members as validated recipes for their lives and actions. Members of communities continuously co-construct their SCMs by enacting them through their everyday interactions. Culture is described as a distributed network of specialized SCMs that guide community members' lives in different domains. According to the TSCM, in order to fully understand the nature of people's actions and experiences, researchers first must examine the system of SCMs that these people were born into - the public aspects of SCMs. Subsequently, researchers must investigate how these people act, experience, and live through these models - the internalized aspects of SCMs - and determine what roles their autonomous agency and self-determination play in their existence. To study SCMs, researchers use methods such as person-centered ethnography, interviews, and experiments.

Key words: theory of sociocultural models, sociocultural models, co-construction of culture and the mind, sociocultural reality, methodology of sociocultural research

An Introduction to the Theory of Sociocultural Models

*What we see is not the world itself, but the world that
is exposed by our sociocultural models.*

A rephrasing of a passage by Werner Heisenberg¹.

Currently, there is a high demand for valid and reliable knowledge about people from different communities, ethnic groups, and ways of lives; social scientists, policy makers, journalists and everyday people want to know about their beliefs and aspirations, their style of living and behaving, and their habits of thinking and experiencing the world. Social science researchers from diverse disciplines are working to decipher these cultural codes. This task becomes even more relevant when researchers consider these groups in their movements nationally and internationally where, through their constant interactions with various other groups, they are creating a mosaic of diversities and pluralities. These studies are about people's sociocultural worlds, about their agency in these worlds, about the pressures and constraints that these worlds impose on people, and about how people change and modify them. These inquiries are complex, challenging, and puzzling, in the same manner as are the investigations of the structure of matter, the dynamics of the universe, and the essence of the living organisms. To guide such research, scholars need theories to connect people's behaviours and experiences with their sociocultural realities, with their own agentic selves, and with each other.

One of primary proposition of modern theoretical thinking in psychology states that the human mind and culture mutually constitute each other (Markus, Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996). In order to determine further theoretical, empirical, and practical implications, this fundamental statement requires a detailed conceptual analysis of what constitutes culture, the human mind, and their interactive interface. Social and psychological researchers have worked on this issue and they have provided numerous insightful and important contributions to this topic (some of them will be reviewed later). The theory of sociocultural models (TSCM) summarizes some of the basic propositions from various theoretical accounts provided by social and human scholars from different disciplines and at different times about the processes of the social and cultural regulation of human behaviour. These propositions outline the ontology of the sociocultural realities and the mechanisms by which these realities regulate peoples' actions and interactions. They provide researchers with an understanding of how human mental functioning and the

¹ The original quote reads, "*What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning.*" Heisenberg, W. (1962). *Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science*.

existing sociocultural environments are mutually interconnected in the continuing cycles of co-construction.

In the following sections, I will outline the main propositions of the TSCM and the innovations that this theory proposes; I will then analyze the history, ontology and mechanisms of sociocultural models and this theory's methodological implications.

The Theory of Sociocultural Models

Every community of people – national, ethnic, religious, organizational, scientific, artistic, urban and rural, age- and gender-related, criminal, etc. – creates an arrangement of knowledge, propositions, categories, and representations about the world around them. These communities also develop scripts for the actions and sanctions that regulate them. These arrangements are structured in the form of *sociocultural models* (SCMs) that are hierarchically organized and distributed among the members of the community. Social scientists use various terms to label this phenomenon (see Table 1). SCMs are complex social, cultural, and psychological phenomena that do not have an analogy in the natural world. They are the products of the functioning of a community of conscious and agentic human beings who are embedded into the sociocultural worlds. These models are the systemic entities that emerge out of the social interactions of rational and goal-oriented individuals within structured social institutions that are saturated with collective meanings. SCMs are the products of cultural evolution driven by humans' cooperative social arrangements and their emerging cognitive capacities (Tomasello, 2014). These community-specific models regulate the lives of people in every community by providing validated and approved means for categorizing various events and situations, for defining and interpreting these occurrences, and for communicating to others about them. These models also prescribe what thoughts, feelings, and motivations individuals should have about them, and what scripts they should follow when reacting to specific events or situations. These models represent the sophisticated regulatory mechanism for managing the behaviours of members of communities across a full spectrum of communal domains, such as family, health care, education, work, governance and many more. Using various terms (mostly 'cultural models,' and 'social representations'), scholars have examined the SCMs of health and health care (Hickman, 2007; Jovchelovitch & Gervais, 1999; Kirmayer & Sartorius, 2007; Kleinman, 1978, 1980; Murray, Pullman, & Rodgers, 2003), education (DeZutter, 2008; Fryberg & Markus, 2007; Gee, 2012; Li, 2012), parenting and childrearing (Chao, 1995; Keller, 2007; Keller et al., 2006; Suizzo, 2002), romantic love (de Munck & Kronenfeld, 2016), marriage (Dunn, 2004; Quinn, 1987), the self (Bharati, 1985; Hollan, 1992), sex (Lavie-Ajayi & Joffe), work and employment (Strauss, 2005), gender, work, and management (Hayes & Way, 2003; Hirsch, 2000); they have discussed models of nature (Bang, Medin, & Atran, 2007), the environment (Ignatow, 2006; Paolisso, Weeks, & Packard, 2013), religion (Geertz, 1973; Spiro, 1987) along with many other models that people deal with in their daily communal lives. SCMs constitute a deep layer of the sociocultural regulation that underlies politics, economics, and law; in fact, they structure and guide the functioning of these institutions. SCMs are at the core of our social

existence. When communities have challenges with poverty, corruption, abuse, their environment, or other matters, the first thing researchers must examine is the underlying models that exist in these communities. When there are misunderstandings, disagreements, or conflicts between various groups, communities, or countries, scholars must first inquire into discrepancies between these groups' SCMs, specifically those that regard the matters of their disputes.

On the importance of considering different perspectives regarding SCMs. As Schutz (1953, 1964) suggested, when dealing with SCMs (he labelled them “systems of typifications and relevances”; see Table 1), it is important to consider the different perspectives that *insiders*, *outsiders*, and *social researchers* have on these models. Insiders live their SCMs and, typically, they experience them as the right, moral, natural, and obvious ways to deal with the world. They take them for granted and execute the behaviours they promote habitually and semi-automatically. For insiders, the totality of these models constitutes their groups' social universe wherein they function. For insiders, this centrality of the group's existence provides the basis for their emerging *ethnocentrism* and, related to this phenomenon, their reactions and attitudes toward other groups (A. D. Smith, 1986; Sumner, 1906/1959). In contrast, outsiders do not see the SCMs of a different group as the right, moral, natural, and obvious ways of perceiving and doing things. They are critical of the ethnocentrism this group may have and they typically do not endorse it. Social researchers perceive communal SCMs as the objects of their investigation. They do not live these models, and these models do not provide guidance for their actions; researchers simply want to extract, identify, and examine SCMs from the perspective of “disinterested observers” (Schutz, 1953, p. 28)². Finally, social researchers have to extract and conceptualize the meanings, experiences, and actions that the in-groups demonstrate in their communal lives while considering the concepts and terms that correspond to the scientific paradigm that guides their inquiry. The researchers have to generalize their knowledge over and above the common-sense knowledge of the insiders in order to make the obtained scientific understanding of the community's SCMs available to other scientists for verification and available to the members of the studied group for their reflection upon the corresponding models. While insiders use their communal SCMs to guide their lives in these communities, researchers aim to examine these communal guidelines for life, reflect on their functioning, and use this knowledge to help these people solve some of their communal problems. To do this, researchers must have a theoretical and conceptual framework to structure their inquiry and to guide them in interpreting and analysing their data. The TSCM provides such a theoretical and conceptual framework for social scientists. It is important to recognize that social researchers are not free from their own models, neither the sociocultural nor idiosyncratic ones (discussed later), as these models frame their perception and interpretation of actions and interactions of insiders (Taylor, 1971). These researchers, either taking the roles of insiders or outsiders to the communities of

² It is important to consider that social scientists may be insiders or outsiders to communities that they examine. These positions may strongly influence their perceptions of the problem and the course of their investigations. (See more on the ‘insider’ versus ‘outsider’ position of researchers in (Chirkov, 2016) and (Headland, Pike, & Harris, 1990).

interest, see the objects of their investigations through the lenses of their communal models (see footnote 2). As they are unable to avoid being embedded in their own cultures, this may lead to researchers' ethnocentrism, stereotyping, and prejudice that may bias data generation and analysis.

The main propositions of the TSCM. First, the TSCM identifies the *public aspects of SCMs*. Other researchers have labelled them "collective representations" (Durkheim, 1912/2008), "the social/institutional stock of knowledge" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1989), and "instituted models" (Shore, 1996). These aspects exist 'out there' in the community; they constitute the social world into which every community member is born. These public aspects have material manifestations in the forms of buildings, tools, technologies, special arrangements of objects and spaces, ways of dressing, food recipes, cooking methods, and more. They also exist in the form of behavioural (rituals) and ideational patterns of attending to, thinking about, and interpreting information about the world (for example, philosophical or religious worldviews). Insiders experience these aspects as a verified 'social reality' that consists of the validated ways of living and doing in their community. These public aspects of communal SCMs are primarily exposed to outsiders when they visit with and live in a community. Researchers have to extract and conceptualize these aspects in order to make them the objects of their scientific investigation.

Second, the TSCM identifies the *internalized aspects of SCMs*. Other researchers have labelled these aspects "internalized conventional models" (Shore, 1996), "cultural cognitive schemas" (D'Andrade, 1992), and "habitus" (Bourdieu, 1984). Members of communities have two types of mental models: *idiosyncratic mental models* and *mental models based on the internalized aspects of SCMs*. Idiosyncratic mental models represent individuals' personal stock of knowledge, experiences, actions, and outcomes that individuals have accumulated throughout their lives; this accumulation of information and experiences constitutes their unique biographies. As Schutz (1953) explained, "only a very small part of my knowledge of the world originates within my personal experience. The greater part is socially derived, handed down to me by my friends, my parents, my teachers and the teachers of my teachers" (pp. 9-10). The internalized aspects of SCMs are people's mental representations of the public aspects of SCMs and they are comprised of the socially derived knowledge about the world, interpretative schemas, and scripts for actions. In order to become full-fledged human beings with a human mentality, consciousness, sense of self and the ability to develop into functional members of their communities, individuals have to internalize the public aspects of SCMs, which are the socially constructed systems of categorization, interpretation, and regulation.

Individuals have different levels of awareness of these models. Their awareness ranges from an implicit, taken-for granted, habitual, and semi-automatic regulation of attention, thinking, and acting (for example, using money to pay for a purchase) to fully cognizant and theoretically articulated usage of models for interpreting the world and acting in it (for example, using a community's criminal code to interpret someone's actions). The public aspects of SCMs

reflect the communal construction of cultural entities; for example, what it means in a particular community to be a good parent, to have good health or to be mentally ill; how to organize learning and teaching; what it means to be a good worker, etc. The internalized aspects reflect how particular members of a community live by these models and experience them. An example of this is how the parents of a disabled child experience and modify the communal SCMs of parenting and disability. The internalized aspects of SCM constitute the essence of the sociocultural regulation of people's actions and experiences in social settings.

Internalized SCMs only partially represent the public aspects of SCMs because various factors filter the SCMs for each member. People may be exposed to different portions of the same SCMs; this can occur when their parents or other socializing agents have provided peculiar representations and interpretations of the models to which they have been exposed or because people have decided to filter out some of the aspects on their own. However, the core of the SCMs must be internalized by each member of a community in order for the community to exist as a coherent social entity. Subsequently, to protect its cohesion and integrity, a community may punish individuals who are not fully enculturated into its models. The community may force them to accept these models, imprison them, expel them, or even kill them if they are not willing to do this. Insiders experience these internalized aspects as their own validated and approved means for interpreting and acting in the world: "This is how we do things here". Some of them may even accept these aspects as their own authentic ways of being that reflect who they are as people. Internalized SCMs constitute the basis of people's communal identities; through them, people's personal and social identification processes are influenced. These internalized aspects are not available to outsiders because it requires time and effort to acquire them. For social researchers, identifying these internalized aspects constitutes an important goal for understanding the core of the sociocultural regulation of actions of social agents within their communities. However, these aspects constitute a challenging phenomenon for empirical investigations because of their taken-for-granted nature and the limited availability for insiders to have direct awareness of them and self-report them.

The next proposition of the TSCM establishes the dialectical interrelatedness between the public and the internalized aspects of SCMs. It is important to remind readers that these two aspects exist only for researchers. Insiders do not experience the SCMs as being split into two aspects; because of this, from the perspective of insiders, such interrelatedness does not exist. This dialectical interrelatedness between two aspects of the models is the hidden mechanism that researchers retroduct³ based on their investigations. Social interactions among community members, when these interactions are executed in an orderly and uniformed manner, are regulated by the internalized aspects of SCMs. Being regulated by these aspects as they execute

³ The term *retroduction* (*retro-induction* – thinking back from empirical evidence to their causes) together with the term *abduction* was suggested by Charles Peirce (Peirce, 1960). It implies making inference from observed empirical regularities to their causal mechanisms. On differences between retroduction and abduction see Chirkov (2016, chapter 4).

them, the interacting community members simultaneously maintain the public aspects of SCMs. This execution of the models simultaneously reinforces these members' personal endorsements of them. The public aspects of SCMs exist because members of a community *intersubjectively* share these models and enact them in their everyday lives. As will be defined in detail later, the term *intersubjectivity* reflects that members of a community not only share the same models, but they also know that they all share them. Every time members of a community interact in culturally organized ways, they co-construct and enable their communal SCMs. Although the public aspects of SCM were created long before the current members of a community were even born, these aspects exist only because members of the community have regularly endorsed and executed them. Consequently, SCMs unite these two aspects – public and private, communal and mental – in a dialectical fashion through people's continued interactions that co-construct the SCMs along with people's mentalities. Public and private aspects of SCMs, like Yin and Yang in Taoist philosophy, create the unity of the models. The SCMs are systemic and emergent entities with two inseparable and interacting components. The dialectical interactions of these two aspects constitute the mechanism of the sociocultural regulation of human actions and of the construction of the sociocultural reality. The Figure represents the above outlined propositions in their dialectical interrelatedness.




Figure. A graphical representation of the theory of sociocultural models. (This concept map was made with IHMC Cmap Tools).

Each of these propositions is not new to the social sciences; however, putting them logically together for sociocultural psychologists is an important and still unfinished task. The TSCM aims to accomplish this.

A historical account of the TSCM. Table 1 (in Appendix) presents a brief historical overview of the ideas, concepts, and mechanisms that constitute the TSCM.

Ideas about social and cultural realities and regarding the sociocultural regulation of people's social lives have a long history and a rich conceptual heritage in the social and human sciences. Upon bringing all these theories and hypotheses together, it seems clear that they ultimately address the same problems in regard to the nature of sociocultural worlds, the relations of these worlds to human experiences and behaviours, and the control that these worlds exercise over people's actions. These theoretical accounts complement each other with their emphases on the existence of and interactions between the public (external, collective, communal, social, cultural, etc.) regulatory mechanisms and, related to them, the private (mental, intrasubjective, personal, etc.) aspects of people's functioning.

How does the TSCM treat culture? The TSCM suggests several innovations for understanding the concepts of culture and society. First, for the purpose of sociocultural psychological research, the TSCM suggests replacing the terms *culture* and *society* and their corresponding adjectives *cultural* and *social* with the adjective *sociocultural*. Many scholars presented in Table 1 embraced this adjective in their analyses; they used it to indicate the natural inseparability of social and cultural in the constitution of human-made worlds. Second, this theory applies the ideas of *social realism* to understand the sociocultural world as *reality*. Third, it defines *sociocultural reality* (SCR) as a hierarchically organized system and a distributed network of specialized SCMs that guides community members' lives in various domains. Fourth, this theory addresses the social ontology of SCR through its *collectively intentional* and *intersubjective* nature. Now, I will elaborate on each of these innovations.

With regard to sociocultural psychological theorizing and research, the TSCM suggests that researchers embrace the term *sociocultural reality* because it reflects the nature of the social and cultural worlds. The *cultural* or symbolic and meaning-based features of the human-made worlds do not exist separately from the *social* structures, roles, expectations, actions of, and interactions among people. These cultural-symbolic features provide human interactions with collective meanings, values, scripts, and regulations. However, these characteristics exist and are maintained as powerful determinants of human actions only because people enact them in their social lives. Ultimately, without these cultural meanings, all social interactions would be void of their significance to the communicating parties. For example, consider the social interactions between a bride and groom and their guests during a wedding. Without understanding the collective meaning of the wedding, the roles that are assigned to different parties and individuals, the reasons for these assignments, and the values that drive this event and its many rituals, this gathering of people becomes a meaningless and noisy crowd. Society's collective meaning of a wedding and the interactions of the wedding guests are inseparable

components of the sociocultural phenomenon of marriage; thus, the concept of marriage could only be understood within the unity of these components. Consequently, the motto of the TSCM is that *there is no social without cultural meanings, and there is no cultural without social interactions, structures, and roles*. Therefore, TSCM proponents talk about *sociocultural* reality, *sociocultural* models, and the *sociocultural* psychology⁴ that is needed to study these entities.

Within the expression ‘sociocultural reality’, the term *reality* is another important inclusion within this theory. This term means that SCMs exist as socially constructed sociocultural entities independently of the thoughts and motivations of any individual member of a community; moreover, these models possess and exert causal powers on these members’ actions and experiences (Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1989; Bhaskar, 1979/2015; Elder-Vass, 2012; Sayer, 2000; Schutz, 1996; Searle, 1995, 2006; C. Smith, 2010). These models existed before modern individuals were born into them and they will continue to exist after these individuals have passed away. They exist independently of individuals’ (including researchers’) knowledge, thoughts, and attitudes about them. Once faced with these models, people experience them as the ‘real reality’ that is out there and that is analogous to the physical world. Despite the fact that SCMs are socially constructed through the endless interactions among members of a community, they acquire emergent systemic properties that make them a determinant of these members’ actions, experiences, thoughts, and feelings. Imagine spending time among passionate fans of a sports team; when one does not express admiration for their team, he or she will immediately notice the power of this group’s model that enforces the appropriate behaviours.

SCR is comprised of a hierarchically-structured and horizontally-distributed system of SCMs. SCMs differ with regard to their specificity. There are general, all-encompassing models (Shore (1996) called them “foundational schemas”) that subordinate and structure the models for specialized purposes. For example, one could build the following hierarchy:

A foundational schema of individualism or collectivism → a SCM of self and person → a SCM of parenting → a SCM of a child disciplining practice.

If a researcher is studying parenting in a cultural community, such a hierarchy requires that he or she examines the broader sociocultural models within which the parenting models and disciplining practices are embedded.

⁴ In my understanding, *sociocultural psychology* invites scholars and researchers to consider every social phenomenon (poverty, discrimination, corruption, violence, abuse, etc.) through the prism of the cultural models that shape and control these phenomena. Social events are inseparable from the cultural regulatory models that stand behind them. Without the analysis of these models, it is difficult to fully explain these events and phenomena. Defined that way, sociocultural psychology embraces cultural and indigenous psychology and many domains of social psychology.

SCMs are distributed among members of a community; however, they are distributed unequally. Thus, some of these members wholeheartedly embrace them; others may filter out some of their elements, and other individuals may only appropriate them to a small extent (See the section on Internalization below). Such different levels of appropriating the models partially relate to people's abilities to reflect upon these models and to become agents of change in a community. Nevertheless, even though community members internalize them to differing degrees, all members of a community must hold these models to some extent in order for a community to exist. Thus, when a researcher identifies and examines the public aspects of SCMs, it is important to investigate the members' endorsements of these models and to consider how these endorsements relate to their problems.

It is essential not to miss the material aspects of SCMs that manifest themselves in the architecture of buildings (for example, temples, churches and mosques represent religious SCMs), the arrangement of public spaces that either unite or separate members of communities (for example, a Communist party meeting where everybody looks in the same direction, and in democratic parliament where the seats are positioned so that the governing party members face the members of the opposition party represent two SCMs of political governance), or manners of dressing that externalize a community's models about gender and sexuality (for example, a face-covering burqa in Islamic communities in contrast with bikinis and swim trunks at Western beaches), status and its management (formal versus casual ways of dressing and their dynamics in different situations), along with many other aspects of people's lives.

The nature, structure, and social ontology of sociocultural models. SCMs are generic and conventional sociocultural entities that have sophisticated ontology and diverse forms of manifestations. SCMs are the means of categorization, typification, and unification of various situations and events in communities; for example, this is a wedding, this is a funeral, this is a strike picket, this is a peaceful demonstration, and this is a military parade. These are instances of typifications of various social gatherings. In addition, each SCM is accompanied by a specific vocabulary that categorises the components of each event to help community members communicate with each other. For example, at a Western wedding, there is a 'bride' and a 'groom'; in addition, there is a 'best man' or a 'groomsman,' a 'maid of honour' or a 'bridesmaid,' and many other terms that vary from location to location. These concepts make no sense outside of the setting of the wedding. Models provide normative interpretations of these events and prescribe the appropriate normative behaviours to members of a community within each of them. They prescribe how people should behave at a wedding or a funeral as well as the emotions they should experience and how they should express these emotions.

Each SCM has a set of constitutive and regulatory rules, sanctions, punishments, and rewards that are used to encourage, discourage, and generally manage members' behaviours. If a person violates these rules, he or she may suffer serious consequences. Behind each model, there are sets of values about, for example, the family, the individual, men, women, children, and their connectedness to the bigger social whole. These values provide the models and the events that

manifest them with deep collective meanings for community members. These values may transcend a particular event and apply to a set of events. For example, the value of an individual (individualism), may clearly be seen in the choice of disciplining practices, but the same value may stand behind teaching methods, a criminal code, as well as, how social places are arranged. SCMs also serve as a system of interpretation that enables the members of a community to understand events in a similar way.

All SCMs have a history of how they developed. They emerged in a particular cultural community and they were affected by its climate, ecology, geography, available resources, and historical and intellectual heritage; subsequently, over the span of years, decades, or even centuries, they have been developed, modified, and changed. Investigating the history of SCMs may vividly demonstrate the constructed and ultimately arbitrary nature of these models. For example, in China, models of learning and teaching can be traced back to Confucian roots; in contrast, the Western models of learning and teaching can be traced back to Socratic roots (Li, 2012). Models may include particular practices that had demonstrated their functionality at a particular time period, but with time they may have become malfunctioning or even useless. For example, in models of parenting, breast feeding was necessary for past generations in order for children to survive; in modern times, it has become less mandatory as artificial breast milk and specialized baby foods have evolved. Studying the history of SCMs constitutes an interesting and important aspect of the TSCM.

Important categorization of cultural models was provided by Schutz (1964) and by Geertz (1973). Schutz differentiated “a scheme of interpretation” from “a scheme of orientation” (pp. 237-238). This division of the system of typifications extrapolated Geertz’s distinction of cultural “models *of*” and “models *for*” something (p. 93-94). Models *of* the world provide people with unified knowledge and interpretive frameworks to apprehend and appreciate various events, situations, and phenomena that happen inside a community and outside of its boundaries. Hence, it is a schema of interpretation. Thus, models *of* health care, for example, supply community members with collective knowledge about how to perceive health and illness. In contrast, models *for* actions are comprised of the scripts and sanctions that orient and regulate peoples’ behaviours after they have interpreted the events. Thus, models *for* health care are comprised of prescriptions for behaviours that enable people to maintain their health, to take care of those who are ill, and to cure them. This analytic distinction is made from the perspective of the researcher. In contrast, insiders do not experience such a differentiation because models work for them simultaneously as interpretive schemas and as guidance and scripts for actions.

SCMs have a complex social ontology. In their nature, these models are both *collectively intentional* and *intersubjectively* shared. Since the work of psychologist Franz Brentano (Brentano, 1984/1973), it has been accepted in the philosophy and psychology of the mind that humans’ mental states are intentional (Searle, 1984). The concept of *intentionality* means ‘aboutness’ or ‘directedness toward’ something. Our mental states are always about something, either in our internal or the external worlds. When we go to a restaurant, when we see beautiful

scenery, when we think about the trajectory of our careers, our corresponding mental states are intentional because they are about our hunger, about nature as it is seen by us, or about ourselves in the future. Notably, these are examples of *individual* intentionality, meaning that these intentional states (my need, my visual image, and my ideas about me in the future) belong to one individual – to me.

Social philosophers and philosophers of the mind talk also about *collective intentionality* as the basis for collective goals, collective actions, and collective beliefs and aspirations (Jankovic & Ludwig, 2018; Searle, 2006; Tuomela, 2013). “Collective intentionality is the power of minds to be jointly directed at objects, matters of fact, states of affairs, goals, or values. Collective intentionality comes in a variety of modes, including shared intention, joint attention, shared belief, collective acceptance, and collective emotion.” (Schweikard & Schmid, 2013, para. 1). Philosophers Searle (1995, 2006, 2010) and Tuomela (2007, 2013) explain the nature of ‘sociocultural’ by its collectively intentional character. Tomasello (2014, 2018) includes collective intentionality as a central construct in his shared intentionality theory of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic origins of human cognition, society and culture. The best description of collective intentionality in relation to sociocultural entities and actions is provided by Shweder (1991). While reading this quotation, if you add in the term ‘collectively’ every time Shweder uses the word ‘intentional,’ you will transform this quotation into a precise illustration of the collective intentional nature of cultural things and, related to them, intentional mental states.

A sociocultural environment is an intentional world. It is an intentional world because its existence is real, factual, and forceful, but only so long as there exists a community of persons whose beliefs, desires, emotions, purposes, and other mental representations are directed at, and thereby influenced by, it. ...

Such intentional (made, bred, fashioned, fabricated, invented, designated, constituted) things [for example, ‘theft’, ‘harm’, ‘in-law’, ‘divorce’, ‘confessional booth,’ and almost all things that exist in the human-made world VC] exist only in intentional worlds. What makes their existence intentional is that such things would not exist independently of our involvements with and reactions to them; and they exercise their influence in our lives because of our conceptions of them. Intentional things are causally active, but only by virtue of our mental representations of them.

Intentional things have no ‘natural’ reality or identity separate from human understandings and actions. Intentional worlds do not exist independently of the intentional states (beliefs, desires, emotions) directed at them and by them, by the persons who live in them. (p. 74-75)

SCMs include collectively intentional things – the public aspects of SCMs – and collectively intentional states – the internalized aspects of SCMs. Thus, they represent collectively intentional entities, the entities that constitute the world of modern humans. Because collectively intentional things and states are the inseparable components of collectively

intentional entities, the public and internalized aspects of SCMs are likewise inseparable in forming these models as the regulators of people's social behaviour.

The picture of the sociocultural ontology will be incomplete if we do not mention its another important attribute; namely *collective intersubjectivity* or the intersubjective sharedness of collectively intentional entities (D'Andrade, 1987, 1989; Gillespie & Cornish, 2009; Schutz, 1953). As the term implies, intersubjectivity means that something exists in-between or among two or more subjectivities or mentalities. D'Andrade (1987) defines intersubjectivity regarding shared cultural schemas: "A schema is *intersubjectively shared* when everybody in the group knows the schema, and everybody knows that everyone else knows the schema, and everybody knows that everyone knows that everyone knows the schema." (1987, p. 113). This is the definition of one form of intersubjectivity, which could be labeled *collective intersubjectivity*. This form of intersubjectivity emerges in groups and it relates to group members sharing the group-level models and schemas that constitute the normative basis of the social regulation of people's behaviour. Another form of intersubjectivity could be called *joint intersubjectivity*.⁵ Joint intersubjectivity is not about sharing groups' normative regulatory schemas; rather, it is about sharing local and personal mental experiences. For example, these experiences could be between mother and child, husband and wife; among members of a family or a sports/work team. These shared models are local, limited in their applicability, and less normative in comparison to the group's normative models. This form of intersubjectivity is important for regulating people's cognition and behaviour in these particular settings. Both forms of intersubjectivity, collective and joint, are rooted in *primary intersubjectivity*. A potentiality toward this form of intersubjectivity is inherited by humans from their evolutionary past and it emerges in children between 9- and 12-months of age. Tomasello (1999, 2014, 2018) describes it as the capacity of understanding of other persons as intentional agents like oneself. This ability to understand that others have mental subjectivity like oneself lays the basis for joint and collective intentionality and, eventually, for human social cognition and sociality.

Phenomenologically, intersubjectivity is experienced in understanding by each person that people within the community share the same beliefs. For instance, I know that you believe in God and you know that I believe in that same God. In addition, we both know that others in our community possess this same belief, and we know that they know that we and others believe in our God too. We all share not only the collectively intentional states of a belief in God (where God is a collectively intentional thing) but also the knowledge about the subjectivities and intentional states of others: everybody knows that others have such a belief. D'Andrade (1989) indicates two features of intersubjective sharing.

A cultural model is a cognitive schema that is intersubjectively shared by a social group.

Because cultural models are intersubjectively shared, interpretations made about the world on the basis of a cultural model are experienced as obvious facts of the world... A further

⁵ Such categorization is analogous to Tomasello's (2014, 2018) differentiation between *joint* and *collective intentionality*.

consequence of the intersubjectivity of cultural models is that much of the information relevant to a cultural model need not be made explicit, because what is obvious need not be stated. (p. 809)

Because of the intersubjective nature of SCMs, members of a community have relatively coherent theories of the minds of other people. They know other people's thoughts, beliefs, and feelings about communal intentional things. Because of this, to some extent, people are able to read other people's minds. This implicit understanding of others in one's community creates a strong feeling of unity, sameness, and coherence. Because of the collective intersubjective sharedness of communal SCMs, individuals also feel unity and connectedness with other members of the community. In turn, this creates the bases for their communal identities. Moreover, they can predict and control the behaviors of each other, which helps make communal life manageable. Collective intentionality and intersubjectivity create the fabric of sociocultural reality by interweaving intentional things, intentional states, and the mutuality of knowledge and experiences of these things and states among community members. Because of its unique social ontology, SCR is fundamentally different from any form of physical reality. Thus, researchers require a fundamentally different way of investigating it.

Internalization of SCMs. Internalization is a mechanism of appropriating external socio-cultural regulatory prescriptions into one's mental sphere and transforming them into one's psychological governing tools⁶. Internalization has been at the center of the theorizing of different scholars including Freud, Vygotsky, Berger and Luckmann, and many others (see (Schafer, 1968; Wallis & Poulton, 2001). In the TSCM, internalization plays an important role in transforming the public aspects of SCMs into the internalized ones during socialization and enculturation. To illustrate the process of internalization in relation to sociocultural entities and models, I will refer to its conceptualization as outlined by anthropologist Spiro (1987). He labeled it "a hierarchy of cognitive salience of a cultural doctrine" (p. 163). This conceptualization was later modified by D'Andrade (1995) (Table 2).

Table 2.

⁶ In recent decades, there has been a re-emergence of interest about the role internalization plays in the ontogenetic development of human agency (Martin, 2006; Martin & Gillespie, 2010; Zitton & Gillespie, 2015). In depth analysis of these insightful theorisings is beyond the scope of this paper.

Two schemas of internalization of sociocultural models

Note: The stages are presented from the bottom up

Stages of internalization	Spiro's hierarchy of cognitive salience of the religious doctrine (1987, pp. 163-164)	D'Andrade's stages of internalization of the system of cultural representations (1995, pp. 227-228)
5. The internalized representations instigate actions, impose strong emotions, and structure worldviews.	“(e) As genuine beliefs the doctrines are not only guide, but they also serve to <i>instigate</i> actions; they possess motivational as well as cognitive properties. Thus, one who has acquired, for example, the doctrine of hell at this - the fifth - level of cognitive salience, not only incorporates this doctrine as part of his cosmography, but he also internalizes it as part of his motivational system; it arouses strong affect (anxiety) which, in turn, motivates him to action whose purpose is the avoidance of hell”	“At the final level, the system of cultural representations is not only internalized, it is highly salient. The cultural system not only guides but instigates actions, and the entire system is invested with emotion. Thus, believing that Jesus died for man's sin, the believer is filled with anxiety about his own sins, and driven to try to atone for these sins in prayer and deeds, and filled with relief and joy at evidence to be saved.”
4. The representations structure perceptions and guide actions. They are invested with emotions.	“(d) At the fourth level of cognitive salience, cultural doctrines are not only held to be true, but they inform the behavioral environment of social actors, serving to structure their perceptual worlds and, consequently, to <i>guide</i> their actions. When cultural doctrines are acquired at this level we may say that they are genuine beliefs, rather than cultural clichés.”	
3. Individuals know, understand, and believe in the cultural representations.	“(c) The actors not only understand the traditional meanings of the doctrines, but understanding them, they <i>believe</i> that the doctrines so defined are true, correct, or right. That actors hold a doctrine to be true does not in itself, however, indicate that it is importantly effects the manner in which they conduct their lives.”	“At the third level, individuals hold their beliefs to be true, correct, or right. At this level, cultural representations structure the behavioral environment of social actors and guide their actions. When the proposition that Jesus died for man's sin is acquired at this level, the individual feels a sense of sin and is concerned to perform the actions necessary to achieve redemption. At this level, cultural representations can be said to be <i>internalized</i> .”
2. Individuals know and understand the cultural representations, but do not believe in them;	“(b) The actors not only learn about the doctrines, but they also <i>understand</i> their traditional meanings as they are interpreted in authoritative texts, for example, or by recognized specialists.”	“At the second level of internalization, cultural representations are acquired as <i>clichés</i> ; the individual honors the descriptive or normative claims more in the breach than in the observance. Spiro uses the example of people who say they believe Jesus died for their sins, but who

they are “cultural clichés.”		have no sense of sin. 'When a cultural system is acquired at this level, it is, as Edward Sapir put it, 'spurious'. (Spiro n.d.a).”
1. Acquaintance with the main components of the system or doctrine.	“(a) The actors <i>learn about</i> the doctrines; as Bertrand Russell would say, they acquire an 'acquaintance' with them.”	“At the first and lowest level, the individual is acquainted with some part of a cultural system of representations without assenting to its descriptive or normative claims. The individual may be indifferent to, or even reject, these claims.”

D’Andrade’s (1995) interpretation of internalization follows the traditional understanding of this concept in its application to cultural entities. “The term internalization is common in psychological anthropology, where it refers to the process by which cultural representations become part of the individual; that is, become what is right and true” (p. 227). Table 2 shows that internalization has several stages or levels and that individuals may end up at any of them. As follows from Table 2, D’Andrade excluded Spiro’s fourth level of internalization and proceeded directly from level three to Spiro’s level five. To answer questions about the number of stages of internalization and their contents, this hierarchy should be the object of empirical investigations. Depending on the level of internalization, the motivational power of SCMs in guiding the perceptions, interpretations, and actions of individuals will be different. Social researchers must examine the level at which people have internalized SCMs to understand the behaviour of community members.

Sociocultural models, human agency, and self-determination. The strong emphasis on the sociocultural modeling of people’s communal behaviour outlined above inevitably raises the question: if SCMs so strongly determine and manage people’s experiences and actions, as the TSCM purports, then how can this theory explain the existence and functioning of human agency, autonomy, and self-determination? The problem is obvious. If human communal functioning is exclusively determined by communities’ internalized SCMs, then humans have to become the puppets of these models. Because of this, there should be no place for human autonomous agency; moreover, the same models (and correspondently the sociocultural milieu) would be perpetuated infinitely without changing or transforming. This is definitely not the case. People resist the existing models (for example, the recent widespread “MeToo” movement against the longstanding SCMs of sexualizing women at the work place that has led to sexual harassment and violence against them) and they transform them (for example, the reconciliation movement in Canada to fight the colonial and supremacist SCMs regarding Aboriginal peoples that led to prejudice and discrimination against them). In fact, people and communities continuously create new SCMs (for example, the struggle to legitimize same sex marriages and families). Even on the individual level, people are not the slaves of their cultural models. They demonstrate various degrees of disobedience as well as genuine autonomy and self-

determination. One then wonders, how can the TSCM account for these liberations from the dictatorship of SCMs?

The problems of structure and agency (Bhaskar, 1979/2015; Giddens, 1984), psychological agency (Frie, 2008; Martin & Gillespie, 2010; Martin, Sugerman, & Thompson, 2003), and culture and autonomy (Chirkov, 2010, 2014, 2017) have been elaborated upon within different disciplines and with different levels of analysis. The relations between society/culture and human agency within the TSCM can be outlined in the following way. The systems of SCMs pre-exist the members of any community. It is essential for human beings to be socialized into these existing communal SCMs through interactions with their primary care givers, peers and other members of their communities. By these processes of socialization and enculturation, individuals become full-fledged members of a community and they become accepted by it. In addition to this acquisition of social position, through the process of internalization and based upon the pre-existing nascent mental capacities, individuals develop the sense of self (Martin, 2008), an ability to consider other people's perspectives (the perspectival self) (Martin, 2006; Tomasello, 1999, 2018) and to reflect on one's own perspectives (the reflexive self) (Martin, 2006). These attributes of the self create the basis for human rationality and autonomy; consequently, they create the potentiality for relative freedom from the dictatorship of sociocultural regulation.

Therefore, the sense of the self that emerges through the process of considering the perspectives of others is the central development that establishes the foundation for human agency. The generalized perspectives of others are represented in the normative demands of the SCMs. Because of this, when a person internalizes SCMs, he or she simultaneously incorporates these perspectives of others into his or her self. "Self-consciousness involves the individual's becoming an object to himself by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself within an organized setting of social relationships" (Mead, 1934/1962, p. 225). By incorporating these perspectives, a person starts forming his or her reflective self with the 'Me' component at its core. However, the 'Me' cannot exist without 'I' that reflects on 'Me' in a particular situation (Martin, 2006). These two aspects of the self, the 'Me' and the 'I', are the primary mental capacities that are involved in determining and managing the two forms of a person's agency, which is the ability to produce actions. As Table 2 illustrates, by internalizing SCMs at the highest levels of their appropriation, these models acquire strong motivational power over people's actions and experiences. Because this determining power emerged, individuals become agentic in following the demands of these models and in executing their prescriptions and norms. Using terms from the self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2017), this may be called *controlled agency*. Although a person is agentic, meaning that he or she is able to initiate actions, in these cases, he or she is controlled by the invisible hand of communal SCMs and must follow their demands; as such, his or her agency is controlled. In control agency, a person's 'I' and 'Me' are nearly indistinguishable.

Autonomous agency is another form of agency that is based on the ability of a person to distance him or herself from an ongoing situation, from ‘Me’ in such this situation, and to reflect on the situation’s determining powers, structures, and consequences and then to act either in accord or against the situational demands (Chirkov, 2017). This reflexivity of self (the ability of ‘I’ to reflect on ‘Me’) lies at the core of human autonomous agency. By reflecting on ‘Me’ during an ongoing situation, individuals discover the invisible power of sociocultural demands and, consequently, they reflect on their communal SCMs. Through these reflections and considerations, a person acquires power over ‘Me;’ consequently, he or she obtains control over the situation and, most importantly, he or she obtains control over the communal SCMs. In this way, these models stop being the invisible taken-for-granted determining forces that manages people’s actions and they become exposed social factors that can be regulated by people.

In this context, regulation means the various levels of influence that an individual may entertain over the SCMs. The lowest level is the ability to psychologically distance oneself from these models and to critically examine them. These models still exist and exert their power on people’s actions; however, now, an autonomous person is not blind to their influences. He or she mentally sees their existence and has the ability to psychologically free him or herself from their influence by critically reflecting upon them. For example, there are numerous accounts of imprisoned individuals who transformed themselves by reflecting upon their criminal past. Thus, while keeping these models intact, an individual may psychologically reject them and search for alternative ways of handling the situations that correspond to them. The next level of freedom from SCMs is the ability to elaborate new ways or new mental models for seeing occurrences, interpreting events, and acting in developing situations. These new models can be the result of learning and internalizing alternative SCMs (for example, accepting the Buddhist worldview instead of the more pragmatic and consumerist Western SCMs) or of creating one’s own unique models to deal with the world. In this case, the primary challenge is to live according to these models and to be faithful to them despite strong pressure from mainstream society to alter them. Finally, an autonomous individual and his or her similar-thinking compatriots may decide to challenge the existing cultural models and, ultimately, to change them. This could happen in the form of a revolution or through other more or less peaceful transformations (for example, abolishing segregation in the USA or the modern movement of reconciliation with the Aboriginal peoples in Canada). The dialectic here is that individuals can only develop their sense of self, consciousness, and rationality because of their continued social interactions with SCMs through mediations by other people. As soon as these mental capacities emerge, an individual develops the capability to free him or herself from the power of these models and to exercise his or her autonomous agency.

The methodology of investigating SCMs. The TSCM sets a relatively uniform framework for research in sociocultural psychology. This research should have at least two steps. Step 1: investigating the public aspects of SCMs pertaining to a domain of a researcher’s interest (e.g., education, health care, parenting, etc.). Step 2: examining the internalized aspects

of SCMs in a purposefully selected group of members of a community under investigation. The first step should be the starting point of any sociocultural psychological research because, without having knowledge of the public aspects of SCMs of a community, researchers do not have a reference point to begin examining the sociocultural mechanisms that regulate people's behaviours and experiences. Researchers are encouraged to examine the hierarchy of models that relate to the topic of interest and to explore the broad sociocultural context wherein SCMs of interest are embedded. An important aspect of Step 1 is to investigate the historical roots of these models and to explore their ecological, socioeconomic, and political determinants. If these inquiries are done thoroughly, they will arm researchers with a complete understanding of the socio-economic and historical backgrounds of the models under investigation.

During Step 2, a researcher examines the internalized aspects of these SCMs and studies how members of a community experience and live in a society guided by these models. The selection of participants and the focus of such an inquiry depend on the problem at hand and the corresponding research questions. For example, if a researcher wants to investigate the cultural barriers that stand in the way of immigrants utilizing a host country's mental health care system, he or she may first explore the public aspects of the SCMs of mental health and its care that exist in the immigrants' home countries (Wang & Chirkov, 2018). Then, he or she may explore the level of the immigrants' identifications with their home country. Subsequently, a researcher would select immigrants with both high and low cultural identifications to investigate their internalized aspects of mental health care SCMs. The differences between these two groups will indicate what components of the SCMs participate in regulating the health-related behaviours of these participants in the host country and how these components may be related to these immigrants' utilization of mental health services.

Psychological anthropologists Robert Levy invented person-centered ethnography and interviewing (Hollan, 2005; Levy & Hollan, 1998). This is how the founder of this method describes it.

There is a significant difference between asking a Tahitian interviewee something like "Please describe for me exactly how and why supercision (a penis-mutilating rite of passage) is done by Tahitians," and asking him "Can you tell me about your supercision?" "What happened leading up to it?" "What happened that day?" "Did it change your life in any way?" "How?" "What did you think and feel about it then?" "What do you think and feel about it now?"

The first question uses the *interviewee as an informant*, as an expert witness (albeit with a limited and special perspective) about some community procedure. The second set of questions treats the *interviewee as a respondent*, as an object of study in him- or herself; it explores what he or she [*sic*] makes of the procedure. ... Person-centered interviewing moves back and forth between the informant and the respondent modes. (Levy & Hollan, 1998, p. 336)

Following this description, this approach examines the public and internalized aspects of SCMs quite well. Approaching an interviewee as an informant and asking him or her about the communal practices – and, I may add, communal values, practices, rituals, and ultimately the communal SCMs – directly relates to examining the public aspects of these models. In turn, interviewing a member of a community as a respondent allows a researcher to explore the internalized aspects of the same SCMs. Together, these two stages of person-centered interviewing fit the structure of the TSCM and serve as appropriate tools to investigate both components of SCMs. Sociocultural psychologists must elaborate and develop detailed schedules for such interviews and make this form of interviewing a standard practice for sociocultural psychological research.

Quinn and her colleagues (Quinn, 2005b) provided another insight into using interviews to investigate cultural models in their public and internalized aspects. In her examination of the American cultural models of marriage, Quinn (1987, 2005a) interviewed married couples and analyzed the keywords, metaphors, and reasoning that she found in the transcripts of her interviews with them; through this manner, she was able to extract the unspoken assumptions about the interviewees' cultural models of marriage. From her findings, the cultural model of marriage consists of eight propositions: Marriage is (1) lasting; it is (2) shared; it is (3) mutually beneficial and based on (4) compatibility; it is (5) difficult; it requires (6) effort; it is (7) risky, and it may (8) succeed or fail (2005, p. 48). Straus (2005) also focused on keywords to explore the cultural models of work and employment in the US. In addition, she examined their interrelationships as these keywords clustered into interviewees' "personal semantic network" of work. This analysis of personal semantic networks allowed the researcher to study the structure of SCMs in their internalized aspects. DeZutter (2008) used similar interview techniques to extract the cultural models of teaching in US communities. Moreover, Blount and Kitner (2007) analyzed interviews keywords in their investigation of the cultural model of African American fishermen.

Several scholars (Boski, 2018; Fox, 2004; Garfinkel, 1967) used field experiments to extract elements of cultural models and to validate their hypotheses about the most salient but taken-for-granted aspects of these models. The idea behind such experiments is straightforward: researchers intentionally violate some hidden assumptions of people's everyday routines and observe how these people react to these violations. The more emotional their reactions are, including frustration and even anger, the more salient the violated aspects are within their internalized SCMs. For example, Fox intentionally jumped queues in a London train station and recorded reactions of people in these queues to this brutal violation of their cultural model of order and fairness. Such experiments derive the most convincing results when they are used to verify hypotheses extracted during person-centered interviewing.

Some researchers have used standardized structured methods to extract cultural models. For example, Li (2002, 2004, 2012) investigated the cultural models of learning using the prototypical method of collecting learning-related terms and then conducting a cluster analysis of

their sorting. The researcher applied this technique to both Chinese and American students of different ages. She complemented this method by asking the students to provide open-ended narratives about learning and applying age-appropriate tests using pictures and proverbs (Li, 2012). Fryberg and Markus (2007) used a battery of methods – including an open-ended questionnaire, a scenario method, and self-report rating scales – to extract and compare cultural models of education of American-Indian (Aboriginal), Asian-American, and European-American students in the USA. In addition, other researchers have experimented with different structured data techniques: free listing and cultural consensus theory (Ross & Medin, 2005); there is potential in using Semantic Differential technique (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) and the Repertory Grid Technique (Fransella, Bell, & Bannister, 2004) to study both the public and internalized aspects of SCMs. There is no established routine of how to best extract and analyse SCMs. Thus, this domain of inquiry offers vast opportunities for curious and innovative sociocultural psychologists among others. As such, the collective efforts of engaged researchers will help move this area forward.

Conclusion

The primary purpose of this paper was to summarize the theoretical accounts about the sociocultural regulation of people's behaviours with the aim of providing a conceptual framework for sociocultural psychologists. This summary was done in support of the TSCM. For psychologists, the outstanding feature of this theory is that it indicates the crucial role that SCMs play in all aspects of the behavioural and mental functioning of people. It directly outlines the sociocultural nature of humans' mental regulation. However, the TSCM does not exclude the possibility for individuals to develop their autonomous agency and their self-determination. This theory also leaves space for the individual idiosyncratic mental models that account for people's unique biographies and experiences. This theory aims to address the longstanding problem of the location of culture: is culture public – something that exists 'out there'? or, is it mental – something that exists inside human minds? The dialectical unity of the public and internalized aspects of SCMs emphasises that the sociocultural reality exists simultaneously outside and inside of human minds. When all these aspects are taken together within this single theoretical framework, they provide a relatively complete picture of human sociocultural, idiosyncratic, and self-determined regulations. It is possible to conclude that the TSCM opens good prospects and wide opportunities to empirically investigate people's functioning in various sociocultural worlds.

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Appendix: *Table 1.* Historical and Conceptual Roots of the Theory of Sociocultural Models

Names and dates	Concepts that correspond to the TSCM	Translations, definitions, and descriptions of the concepts	Comments
Johann von Herder (second half of the 18 th c.) and Wilhelm von Humboldt (see (Jahoda, 1992; Klautke, 2013).	<i>Volksgeist (VG)</i>	<i>Spirit of the people.</i> <i>VG</i> is difficult to define. Lazarus and Steinthal interpret it as “the law-governed behavior and development of inner activity” of people (Kalmar, 1987, p. 675). <i>VG</i> is “a system of opinions, concepts, understandings, and ideas” that are embedded in people’s ever-developing activity (p. 676).	The concept of <i>VG</i> is closely related to the modern concept of culture (Kalmar, 1987). Lazarus and Steinthal introduced the ideas of there being “objectivized” and “purely mental” aspects of <i>VG</i> (p. 679). These aspects are similar to the proposed public/communal and the internalized/mental aspects of SCM.
Moris Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal; Wilhelm Wundt (end of the 19 th and the beginning of the 20 th century).	<i>Völkerpsychologie (VP)</i>	<i>Folk or ethnopsychology.</i> <i>VP</i> is a discipline for studying <i>VG</i> . The problem of <i>VP</i> “relates to those mental products which are created by a community of human life and are, therefore, inexplicable in terms merely of individual consciousness, since they presuppose the reciprocal action of many” (Wundt, 1916, p. 3).	The discipline of <i>VP</i> focuses on studying both the objectivized and the mental aspects of <i>VG</i> . Following Wundt’s interpretation, the objects of <i>VP</i> are the communal socio-mental phenomena that override individual consciousness and exist because of the repeated interactions of communal members.
Emile Durkheim, the end of the 19 th and the beginning of the 20 th century.	<i>Social fact (SF); collective representations (CR);</i> In his thinking about <i>CR</i> , Durkheim was influenced by the idea of <i>volkerpsychologie</i> (Klautke, 2013).	The social realm is made up of <i>SF</i> . It “consists of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling external to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion by reason of which they control him” (Durkheim, 1895/1938, p. 3). <i>CR</i> are “the ideas, beliefs, and values elaborated by a collectivity and that are not reducible to individual constituents. ... <i>CR</i> help to order and make sense of the world... [They] inhibit and stimulate social actions. Their force...comes from them being within all of us and yet external to the individual” (Scott & Marshall, 2009).	<i>CR</i> is another term used for the public aspects of SCMs. In Durkheim’s interpretation, <i>CR</i> do have connections to the mental “sociopsychological” functioning of people. In this analysis of <i>CR</i> , Durkheim articulates the structure and the functions of the public aspect of SCMs. Among these functions, the primary one is control of people’s actions.

<p>William Graham Sumner (1906)</p>	<p><i>Folkways (F) and mores (M)</i></p>	<p><i>F</i> serve the people in a community by establishing “uniform, universal in the group, imperative, and invariable” (Sumner, 1906/1959, p. 3) ways of gratifying the needs of community members. When people reflect upon and accept <i>F</i>, they become <i>M</i> as “the science and art of living” (p.3).</p>	<p>These two terms also reflect the idea of the public/communal aspects of SCMs. <i>F</i> are the more taken-for-granted aspects of social regulation, whereas <i>M</i> are the consciously executed customs and rituals. Both of them regulate people’s behaviours, cognition, and experiences.</p>
<p>George Herbert Mead (1934)</p>	<p><i>Generalized other (GO); generalized social attitudes (GSA); institutions</i></p>	<p>The <i>GO</i> is "the organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self... The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community." (Mead, 1934/1962, p. 154). Mead continues by explaining, "there are what I have termed ‘generalized social attitudes’ which make an organized self possible. In the community there are certain ways of acting under situations which are essentially identical, and these ways of acting on the part of anyone are those which we excite in others when we take certain steps" (pp. 260-261).</p>	<p>Mead, a social philosopher and theoretical psychologist, paved the path to understanding the mechanism that culturally shapes the mental world of individuals: their minds and selves, by considering the influence of <i>GO</i> and the <i>GSA</i>. These terms emphasise the communal nature of the public aspects of SCMs as well as their importance in shaping people’s mental regulations. Social institutions are established patterns of communal responses to repeating situations.</p>
<p>Lev Vygotsky (1934)</p>	<p><i>The general genetic law of cultural development; internalization (I) of symbolic operations; interconnectedness of social and cultural</i></p>	<p>“Any function of the child's cultural development appears twice, or on two planes. First, it appears on the social plane, and then on the psychological plane. First, it appears between people as an interpsychological category, and then within the child as intrapsychological category” (Vygotsky, 1979, p. 163). <i>I</i> is “the internal reconstruction of an external operation” (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 56). This scholar also speaks about the inextricable interconnectedness of <i>social</i> and <i>cultural</i>: “The word social when applied to our subject has great significance. Above all, in the widest sense of the word, it means that everything that is cultural is social. Culture is the product of social life and human social activity” (Vygotsky, 1979, p. 164).</p>	<p>Vygotsky unequivocally speaks about interconnectedness of the sociocultural mental realms. He highlights the mechanism of <i>I</i> to explain how the socially and historically developed activities that exist in a society enter a child’s mind. Through the process of internalization, the child’s mental sphere is transformed into a mature human mind. Vygotsky’s theorizing directly addresses one mechanism of the relationships SCMs have with the human mind.</p>
<p>Serge Moscovici</p>	<p><i>Social representations (SR)</i></p>	<p><i>SR</i> are "system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function; first, to establish an order which will enable individuals to orient themselves in their</p>	<p>Moscovici started his thinking by considering Durkheim’s collective representations; from there, he added the psychological content to them. <i>SR</i></p>

<p>(1961/2008, 1988, 2001)</p>		<p>material and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history" (Moscovici, 1973, p. xiii).</p>	<p>have two sides: social and psychological. They categorize and conventionalize the objects in the world; they interpret these objects; they prescribe what to see, what to think about these objects, and how to behave toward them. Their primary role is to control people's behavior in a community. <i>SR</i> is another term for SCMs.</p>
<p>Alfred Schutz (1953, 1964)</p>	<p>-<i>The system of typifications and relevances (ST&R);</i> -<i>the stock of knowledge (SofK);</i> -<i>intersubjectivity</i></p>	<p>The ST&R, which is historically developed by a community, categorizes the world and typifies reactions to it. The system differentiates the facts that are relevant for solving the emerging problems from those that are not. It typifies people's reactions to problems by assigning them to particular roles. This system functions as both a "scheme of interpretation" and "a scheme of orientation" for the members of a group. The former interprets the world (categorizes and establishes relevances) and the latter guides people's actions (Schutz, 1964, pp. 237-238). At any given moment, a person has a <i>stock of knowledge</i> at hand that is comprised of learned systems of typification and a collection of his/her past experiences that guide his or her actions. The social world is the <i>intersubjective</i> world that is common to all members of the community. The interactions of community members are mutually congruent and they co-construct the <i>ST&R</i>.</p>	<p>Schutz's theorizing about the mechanisms of people's everyday interactions is another predecessor of the TSCM. He speaks about both the sociocultural and experiential aspects of social functioning; moreover, he connects them through ST&R. Schutz continuously emphasizes the '<i>intersubjective</i>' nature of sociocultural realities. By introducing the concepts of the <i>schemas of interpretation</i> and <i>orientation</i>, he extrapolates Geertz's distinction between cultural models <i>of</i> and <i>for</i> something (Geertz, 1973, pp. 93).</p>
<p>Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966/1989)</p>	<p><i>Institutionalization;</i> -<i>The social/institutional stock of knowledge;</i> -<i>Externalization, objectivation, and internalization;</i> -<i>Intersubjectivity;</i></p>	<p>According to Berger and Luckmann (1966/1989), "... Society exists as both objective and subjective reality" (p. 129). Institutionalization is an establishment of an ordered system of relations based on typified solutions of the most common everyday problems: the institution of the marriage and family, parenting and schooling, job and work. Thus, a communal and institutional collection of the ST&R that includes "specific bodies of</p>	<p>These authors complement and extend Schutz's theorizing about the social regulation of people's everyday activities. They see the sociocultural world as <i>objective</i> (institutional, existing 'out there') and <i>subjective</i> (experienced and mentally represented in individuals' minds) <i>reality</i>. This reality is human-made and socially constructed. These scholars differentiate the social/institutional stock of knowledge that exists 'out there' in a</p>

	<p><i>-The social construction of social reality</i></p>	<p>knowledge” constitutes a <i>communal/institutional stock of knowledge</i> into which a person is born. This stock is shared with others in a community, and all the people in the community know this. Hence, the stock of knowledge is <i>intersubjectively</i> shared. <i>Internalization</i> is a process “by which the objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness in the course of socialization” (p. 61). “...Internalization in the general sense is the basis, first, for an understanding of one’s fellow-men and, second, for the apprehension of the world as a meaningful and [<i>sic</i>] social reality ...” (p. 130). <i>Externalization</i> is an ongoing human production of social order (p. 52).</p>	<p>community from the individual stock that a person derives from the social stock and uses to guide his or her communal activities. The social stock of knowledge is intersubjectively shared. Through the processes of <i>externalization</i> and <i>internalization</i>, the social and individual stocks of knowledge interact with one another and co-construct each other.</p> <p>The theorizing of Berger and Luckmann constitutes a solid base of the TSCM. They unmistakably articulate the public and internalized aspects, talk about them as socially constructed social reality and outlines the mechanisms of such construction.</p>
<p>Pierre Bourdieu (1984)(1984)</p>	<p><i>Field (F); habitus (H); social reality. the objective world production</i></p>	<p><i>F</i> is understood as “a field of forces, whose necessity is imposed on agents who are engaged in it, and as a field of struggles within which agents confront each other...” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 32). <i>H</i> is “an acquired system of preferences, of principles of vision and division (what is usually called taste), and also a system of durable cognitive structures (which are essentially the product of internalization of objective structures) and of schemes of action which orient the perception of the situation and the appropriate response” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 25). <i>Practices</i> are triggered by objective conditions, while they are generated and guided by the <i>H</i>. “Social reality exists, so to speak, twice, in things and in minds, in fields and in habitus, outside and inside of agents. And when habitus encounters a social world of which it is the product, it finds itself ‘as fish in water,’ it does not feel the weight of the water and takes the world about itself for granted” (Wacquant, 1989, p. 43).</p>	<p>Bourdieu proposes a relatively complete theory of social actions by identifying <i>Fs</i> that exist ‘out there’ and agents with <i>H</i> that interact within these fields. These interactions generates actions and practices. <i>Fs</i>, which are structured by objective positions of agents and their relations with other agents, represent a form of the public SCMs. <i>H</i> are the socially created, internalized, and taken-for-granted regulatory mechanisms that guide people’s perceptions, interpretations, and practices within their environments. <i>H</i> is another term for the internalized aspects of SCMs. <i>H</i> have both the interpretive and action-generating aspects (the model <i>of</i> and <i>for</i> (see above)); they are taken-for-granted and pervasive in people’s everyday lives.</p> <p>Through the enactment of a set of habitus, individuals construct the objective social reality.</p>

<p>Cognitive and linguist anthropologists: Roy D’Andrade (1995), Naomi Quinn (2011, 2005b) and Dorothy Holland (1987), Bradd Shore (1996), and David Kronenfeld (2008, 2018).</p>	<p><i>Cultural schema (CS); cultural models (CMs); internalization of culture and cultural models (see the text).</i></p>	<p>According to D’Andrade, “A cultural model is a cognitive schema that is intersubjectively shared by a social group” (1989, p. 809). "Cultural models are presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behavior in it." (Holland & Quinn, 1987, p. 4).</p> <p>According to Shore, there is "...a particularly powerful way of thinking about culture: as an extensive and heterogeneous collection of 'models,' models that exist both as public artifacts 'in the world' and as cognitive constructs 'in the mind' of members of a community" (1996, p. 44). "Cultural models are a stock of tools, at once external and internal, social and cognitive. Models aid in the processing of information and in people's active construction of meanings out of the complex, diverse, and partial information they gather" (p. 68).</p> <p>“Collective cognitive structures (... ‘cultural knowledge systems’) are collectively held, distributed cognitive structures that serve as a repository of cultural knowledge for a cultural community”(Kronenfeld, 2018, p.53).</p>	<p>A school of cognitive anthropology led by D’Andrade and his colleagues emphasizes the cognitive, mental aspects of shared cultural schemas or models. Hence, these researchers focus on the mental aspects of SCMs. Shore criticises the narrow understanding of <i>CMs</i> and argues for differentiating <i>external</i> and <i>public forms</i> (“publicly available forms” or “instituted models” in Shore’s terms) and “mental models” or “mental constructs” (1996, pp. 44-45). Shore also differentiates between <i>personal</i> or <i>idiosyncratic</i> and <i>conventional</i> (or social and cultural) <i>mental models</i>. He also distinguishes “internalized conventional models... as part of my own stock of ready-made responses” (p. 47). In addition, he also differentiates between the “foundational schemas” (models) that structure more specific “special-purpose models” (p. 45). Shore views culture as “a stock of shared cognitive resources of my community” (p. 47) and as “a stock of tools” (p. 68). The TSCM is a direct descendant of Shore’s version of a theory of cultural model.</p> <p>Kronenfeld (2008; 2018) has conceptualized another version of the theory of cultural models (CMs). It has the same components that other scholars have suggested: a collective repository of cultural knowledge, individual representations of communal cognitive systems, which are formed through implicit learning during social interactions, and three forms of CMs: CMs of thoughts, cultural concept systems, and CMs of actions.</p>
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